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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of the characterization of the attack known as the "primary user 
emulation" in mobile cognitive radio networks performing the implementation and testing. The 
tools and their configuration to carry out the attack are presented and their effects on the 
network are analyzed. The results show how to generate the attack with a software-defined 
radio equipment (SDR) using GNU-Radio and OpenBTS. The effects of the possible 
configurations of the attack on the network are shown, the malicious type generates constant 
interference on the primary or cognitive network, the selfish type allows to imitate a licensed or 
primary user generating interference to the primary network and inability to access the 
Cognitive Network while active. If the emulator's power level is fixed, the services it provides 
are stable. If the power is variable the services suffer intermittency. Primary user emulation is 
the attack that most affects the cognitive radio network so its effects are analyzed in order to 
propose ways of detecting or applying countermeasures.  
Keywords: mobile cognitive radio network, primary user emulation, security, software defined 
radio, USRP. 
 
Resumen 
En este artículo se presentan los resultados de la caracterización del ataque conocido como la 
“emulación de usuario primario” en redes móviles de radio cognitiva realizando la 
implementación y pruebas. Se presentan las herramientas y su configuración para efectuar el 
ataque y se analizan sus efectos sobre la red. Los resultados muestran cómo generar el ataque 
con un equipo de radio definido por software (SDR) utilizando GNU-Radio y OpenBTS. Se 
muestran los efectos de las posibles configuraciones del ataque sobre la red, el tipo malicioso 
genera interferencia constante sobre la red primaria o cognitiva, el tipo egoísta permite imitar 
un usuario licenciado o primario generando interferencia a la red primaria e imposibilidad de 
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acceso a la red cognitiva mientras este activo. Si el nivel de potencia del emulador es fijo los 
servicios que presta son estables. Si la potencia es variable los servicios sufren intermitencia. 
La emulación de usuario primario es el ataque que más afecta la red de radio cognitiva por lo 
que se analizan sus efectos para poder plantear formas de detección o aplicar contramedidas.  
Palabras clave: redes móviles de radio cognitiva, emulación de usuario primario, seguridad, 
radio definido por software, USRP. 
1. Introduction 
Recent studies have shown the underutilization of the radio spectrum and its scarcity in 
countries like Colombia [1]. For this reason, it is important to analyze technological alternatives 
that allow its optimization, for which strategies such as the implementation of Emerging 
Networks such as the Mobile Cognitive Radio Network that allow an improvement in the use of 
this valuable means of communication are proposed [2]. 
In general, an area of study that has a significant impact today is the security of the networks 
[3-4], both from the point of view of the information transmitted by the user, and the security of 
the network against vulnerabilities external In this case, it is essential to start with a study of the 
possible attacks on the mobile cognitive radio network, its classification, behavior, the impact 
on the network or on the users who make use of it and subsequently generate detection or 
defense strategies [5]. 
Within the classification of attacks on the cognitive network, there are some that are common 
to all wireless networks [6], but there are some specific attacks on the mobile cognitive radio 
network. When reviewing the classification of attacks, it is found that one of the attacks that 
most affects the Network is the Primary User Emulation (PUE), since it can affect all cycles of 
the cognitive process and disable services to secondary users even affecting somehow the 
primary users [2, 7]. 
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In the literature, it is found that the studies developed have been implemented on simulation 
software, but have not been tested in a real environment, the theoretical aspects of the attack 
are raised and simulations are carried out. The first objective of this work is through 
programmable devices such as SDR and GNURadio, implementing a mobile cognitive radio 
network and obtaining real evidence of its operation by providing services to mobile secondary 
users [7–9]. The second objective is to achieve the generation of the primary user emulation 
attack, to subsequently analyze its impact on the network and to be able to characterize all 
types of derived attacks. Having the knowledge of how the attack is generated and its 
characterization, the next step is to generate defense or detection strategies. 
The following work carries out the characterization of the primary user emulation in mobile 
cognitive radio networks through the classification, implementation and testing of radio 
equipment defined by NI USRP-2922 software. Section two shows the used methodology. In 
section 3 the results of the experiments are analyzed and finally in section 4 the conclusions 
are made. 
2. Methodology 
In this section the fundamental theoretical concepts are presented, together with the 
assemblies made for the different hardware and software components of the mobile cognitive 
radio network and the primary user emulation attack, the tools, algorithms and the initial 
characterization of the attack. 
2.1. Mobile Cognitive Radio Network 
The mobile cognitive radio network is defined as a network created for the purpose of constantly 
monitoring, perceiving or detecting the frequencies of the primary user (PU), which pays for the 
license of the use of the radio spectrum and in the instants of time that it does not use it, provide 
its own secondary users (SU), a service that can be calls, messages or data in general [10]. In 
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Figure 1, the process can be observed, where the spectral holes are searched, that is, the time 
spaces where the frequency is not used, this is where the cognitive radio takes advantage of 
for its communication [11]. 
Figure 1. Spectral holes in Cognitive Radio. [11] 
 
It is important to note that if a primary user is detected at some point in the communication, the 
cognitive network must be able to release the channel automatically so that there is no 
affectation to the primary user, so the system hops from frequency to frequency as soon as a 
frequency is released or used within the working band [10]. To achieve this goal, the cognitive 
radio team must have the ability to perform a spectral analysis, while carrying out its 
communication [11]. The 802.22 standard is defined as the first standard that works with 
cognitive radio, for wireless networks, but focuses on fixed point-multipoint networks, such as 
television in 54MHz to 862 MHz bands [12]. In the case of the cognitive network, due to the 
characteristics of the SDR NI USRP-2922 equipment and according to the regulations and 
spectral assignment of Colombia, the experiment uses the 850MHz band of the cellular 
network. 
For this experiment, the SDR will be used as a cognitive base station for the mobile cognitive 
radio network, which is configured centrally as a mobile base station works. Two devices will 
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be connected to this device to make a voice call. If the selected channel in the frequency band 
is not used by the primary user, the communication is made. However, if a PU or a PUE uses 
the communications channel, given the impossibility of recognizing the origin, it must make a 
hop to another free available frequency. In case frequencies are not available for 
communication, it will be suspended until the channel is released. 
2.2. Primary User Emulation Attack 
The Primary User Emulation (PUE), is defined as one of the greatest vulnerabilities of the 
cognitive network, since the fundamental objective is to imitate in the best way the properties 
and characteristics of a primary or licensed user and due to the architecture of cognitive radio, 
it must release the channel by recognizing the attacker as a primary user [13]. Figure 2 shows 
the general form of the experiment, where the frequencies of the primary base station are 
explored directly in the cognitive base station, from here the available frequencies are 
distributed or the channels are released, it can be seen that the PUE directly affects the SU 
through the detection made by the cognitive base station. 
Figure 2. PUE General Structure. [14] 
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As can be seen for cognitive radio, the use of their frequencies must be transparent to the 
primary network, the objective is that the communications of their primary users are not altered. 
On the other hand, the PUE generates an emulation of the primary signal, with the main 
objective of release the channel for its own objectives [14]. These objectives can be two 
according to the literature; Selfish: It refers to attacking the cognitive network, so that it releases 
a frequency band and use it for its own benefit, that is, to meet service requests of its SUs; 
Malicious: It refers to the fact that it does not want to transmit data, it does not attend SU 
services, it only interferes the system so that the cognitive network cannot use a frequency 
range [5, 14]. 
The primary user emulation attack for the experiments will be generated through an NI USRP-
2922, which will function as a centralized PUE, due to the capabilities of the cell phones used. 
Two PUEs will be connected through the centralized to make calls in selfish mode, for the 
malicious mode radio frequency signals similar to a PU are sent, but a service is not provided, 
only the channel is occupied. 
Figure 3. Testbed for experiments. 
 
Source: own. 
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In Figure 3 the scheme used for the experiment can be seen, the used software is OpenBTS 
and GNU-Radio on Linux, together with the spectrum analyzer controllers. In hardware we use 
two RTL2832U, which serve as spectrum analyzer and two NI-USRP2922, for the cognitive 
base station and the generation of the PUE. 
The experiments are initially divided into generating and verifying the impact of the PUE attack 
on the mobile cognitive radio network with the selfish mode and the ambitious mode. First, 
OpenBTS is installed with the cognitive protocol, so that it can perform permanent spectrum 
detection and channel assignment to communicate to SUs. The PUE is also configured to 
launch the attack only in the absence of a PU and it is verified what happen if I change the 
signal strength over time. Measurements are also made on the channel when the SUs 
connected to the cognitive station are in movement. 
3. Results 
This section will illustrate the used architecture, software, hardware, the experiments and the 
obtained results. 
3.1. Software 
In GNU Radio, the main components of RTL-SDR and UHD are used to configure the spectrum 
analyzer and cognitive radio equipment, a Python file is generated that can be modified to 
perform frequency reading, assignment and frequency hop of cognitive radio, as well as 
recording the results in a file "resultados.bin". These components of GNU Radio can be seen 
in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Main GNURadio Components. 
 
Source: own. 
In both the cognitive radio base station and the attacker, the OpenBTS software components 
are installed, which allow GSM communication for calls or messages between cell phones that 
are correctly authenticated in the network [15]. 
3.2. Hardware 
For physical implementation, an NI-USRP 2922 was used to generate the PUE and another for 
the cognitive base station. To carry out the tests with the fixed PUE, the direct connection of 
the antenna is made. For the dynamic PUE, the antenna is adapted to a drone that allows its 
mobility, that is, the antenna is moved and not the complete equipment, because this would 
include moving the computer equipment and the USRP. Figure 5 shows the fixed and dynamic 
location hardware for PUE. 
For the experiment, the location element can be fixed or mobile and in addition the cellular 
equipment of both the SU and the PUE can also be fixed or moving. The objective is to observe 
the behavior of the calls made between the two cell phones when the PUE and the same cell 
phones are fixed and moving. The tests are carried out in an indoor environment with elements 
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such as walls, desks, chairs, among others, the distance is 5 meters between the components 
of the cognitive base station and the PUE. 
Figure 5. USRP for fixed and dynamic location PUE. 
 
Source: own. 
3.3. Characterization 
The characterization of the PUE attack is then carried out based on laboratory tests. 
3.3.1. PUE with fixed location 
In the PUE with fixed location the devices are placed in a random position, a call between two 
cell phones is activated in the cognitive base station and the activation of the PUE is carried 
out in malicious mode. In this mode we are at the same frequency that the cognitive base station 
is using and we carry out a test communication. In Figure 6 we can see the behavior when 
there is only the cognitive base station and when the PUE appears. If they are at the same 
frequency, a higher power can be seen, but at the level of connectivity as soon as the PUE is 
activated, the cognitive base station changes the channel or terminates the connection if there 
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are no channels available. In this mode, the PUE does not provide service to its equipment, it 
is only interfering. 
Figure 6. MCRN with and without malicious PUE. 
 
Source: own. 
In selfish mode, the PUE is configured to use a specific frequency and its users are connected, 
a communication is made. The results show that as soon as the PUE is activated the MCRN 
release the channel, and if it was not occupying it, it can no longer be used. The active selfish 
PUE signal can be seen in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Selfish PUE. 
 
Source: own. 
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The theory shows that if a double potential decision threshold can be found to separate the PU 
from the PUE, this point could be found, but this assumes that the signal of the PU is larger 
than that of the PUE, this can be seen in (1), where 𝑦(𝑡) is the signal received at the cognitive 
base station [16]. 
 𝑦(𝑡) = {
𝑛(𝑡)
ℎ(𝑡) ∗ 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡)
ℎ(𝑡) ∗ 𝑠′(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡)
       
𝑆𝑈
𝑃𝑈
𝑃𝑈𝐸
                                           (1) 
Then 𝑛(𝑡) is assumed as a noise signal, ℎ(𝑡) as the impulse response, 𝑠(𝑡) as the signal 
received from a PU and 𝑠’(𝑡) as the imitated PUE attack signal. 
The results show that measuring this difference between the two levels even though PUE is 
fixed is not possible, they may have similar power levels. For this reason, the PUE in this case 
is established as shown in (2). 
𝑦(𝑡) = {
𝑛(𝑡)
ℎ(𝑡) ∗ 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡)
    
𝑆𝑈
𝑃𝑈 / 𝑃𝑈𝐸
                                         (2) 
3.3.2. PUE with dynamic location 
In the PUE with dynamic location, the devices are placed in a position and moved randomly, a 
call is activated between two cell phones at the cognitive base station and the activation of the 
PUE is carried out in malicious mode. In this mode we are at the same frequency that the 
cognitive base station is using and we carry out a test communication. In Figure 8 we can see 
the behavior when there is only the cognitive base station and when the PUE appears. In this 
case, even if it moves the behavior is the same over time, it makes a constant interference, 
which causes the cognitive base station to frequency hop or terminate the communication. 
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Figure 8. Malicious PUE with dynamic location. 
 
Source: own. 
In the selfish PUE with dynamic location, the PUE is configured to use a specific frequency and 
its users are connected, a communication is made. The results show a similar behavior of the 
fixed PUE, with the difference that the power levels vary over time, depending on the threshold 
chosen in the cognitive base station deactivates the communication, it cannot identify whether 
it is a PU or a PUE. The measured signal of selfish dynamic PUE without signal, with a position 
close to the cognitive base station and with a position five meters away can be seen in Figure 
9. 
Figure 9. Selfish dynamic location PUE measured signal without PUE, near cognitive network 
and five meters away. 
 
Source: own. 
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3.3.3. PUE with variable power 
For this experiment, selfish and malicious modes with fixed PUE are performed. For the 
malicious mode it is possible to generate variable powers every 5 seconds, which can confuse 
energy-based detection systems, their reception level varies between -80dBm and -40dBm. In 
the selfish mode it is not possible to carry out the experiment, since when we have a service 
connected, the power of the service cannot be varied, the call would have to be disconnected 
and restarted again, so it is concluded that the utility of the PUE with variable power is in a 
malicious environment, but not selfish. 
3.3.4. SU Affectation 
The first thing we notice when performing the experiments, whether fixed or dynamic, selfish or 
malicious, is that the SU will search for the mobile cognitive radio network, so a list of possible 
networks will appear, as can be seen in Figure 10. 
Figure 10. Available networks for SU. 
 
Source: own. 
Several options appear, that the PUE has the same name and characteristics as the main 
network, in our case 02002 or that has different names and that are in the same frequency of 
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use. The results show that if they have the same name even if it goes on different frequencies 
cause that the user does not know which one to connect to, it can even try to authenticate, but 
the process will result in error, as can be seen in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Connection error. 
 
Source: own. 
In conclusion, if the name of the network is the same, it will not let the SU connect to the 
network, even if it is registered for authentication. On the other hand, if there is a call from the 
SU, it will be disconnected when the PUE is activated. 
The fixed or dynamic PUE has the same changes for the SU, since it starts in the network 
name, the connection frequency and the results within the coverage range of the cognitive base 
station are the same, even if the SUs are mobilized in the same range the results are the same, 
for these experiments the mobility of the SU or the same PUE have the same impact on the 
network. However, in the detection systems the impact of this behavior is high, since it modifies 
the estimation parameters of the detection systems and even with the movement, leaving some 
systems unusable. As the objective is the mobile cognitive radio network, the dynamic PUE is 
more viable. 
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3.3.5. Types of PUE 
According to the results of the experiments, we can conclude the types of PUE, as can be seen 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Types of PUE. 
Types of PUE Definition Impact on MCRN 
MALICIOUS 
This attack does not seek to provide its 
own services, it only seeks to make 
interference in the selected frequency 
bands. 
It causes constant interference in the working 
bands for the SU or even the PU. 
SELFISH 
This attack seeks to appropriate the 
selected frequency band to transmit its 
own information. 
By mimicking the signal of the PU, it makes the 
cognitive network release the work frequency 
and provides communication to its own users, 
this does not affect the PU. 
FIXED 
It is located in a specific position, in a 
range where you can provide your 
services. 
The location does not influence the result of the 
PUE, but it does affect the detection system. 
DYNAMIC 
Its location is variable by necessity or for 
trying to skip the detection systems. 
On the move, the characteristics of the mobile 
PUE are equal to the fixed PUE, since the 
detection systems are cheated by dynamic. 
FIXED POWER Signal strength does not vary over time. 
It is used in the selfish or malicious PUE, it 
causes disconnection. 
VARIABLE 
POWER 
Signal strength varies over time. 
It is used in malicious PUE, it causes 
disconnection. In the selfish does not allow 
continuous connection to users. 
Source: own. 
4. Conclusions  
Through the use of software-defined radio devices it is possible to generate attacks on the 
mobile cognitive radio network that include the alteration of the detection data and the emulation 
of the signals coming from a primary network. 
The PUE can have characteristics and information similar to the primary network, if the target 
is a malicious attack, it can affect the SU and also the PU. If the objective is a selfish attack, it 
will only affect the SU of the mobile cognitive radio network. 
If the PUE imitates the name of the real primary network or even that of the cognitive network, 
it causes authentication and connection problems to the SUs and the PUs. 
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The power of the PUE must be fixed if the objective is selfish, provide services to its own users. 
In the case of variable power, it can be used in malicious attack making it difficult to detect. 
When using an energy detector, the mobile cognitive radio network is able to make the 
frequency hopping to not affect the PU, detection systems must be improved to be able to 
separate the signal from the PU and the PUE. 
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